Engineering Case Study: Detailed Analysis of the COP 30 Fire and a Critique of Structural Safety

The COP 30 fire in Belém, which recently occurred (November 20, 2025) in the Countries Pavilion within the Blue Zone, transcends mere headlines. For the engineering world, it becomes a critical case study on risk management, Fire Safety Engineering (FSE), and the construction of high-value temporary infrastructure.

This post delves into the technical aspects of the incident, exploring how a system failure, potentially a short-circuit, can compromise the safety of a major international event.

The Incident Context: Temporary Infrastructure and High Risk

The COP 30 Blue Zone is a complex cluster of modular and temporary structures, designed to host delegation stands and exhibitions. This temporary nature imposes the greatest challenges on safety engineering:

The Fire Load Challenge (Based on Brazil’s IT 14)

In an exhibition environment, the fire load (the amount of heat that can be released by the combustion of all materials) is extremely high. Marketing materials, stand claddings (often untreated plastics or fabrics), and the density of electronic equipment contribute to the rapid spread of fire.

Technical Analysis: FSE mandates that the Fire and Panic Safety Project (PSCIP/Fire Safety Plan) must utilize materials with a low Flame Spread Index (FSI), even in provisional structures, to decelerate the fire's advance until the Fire Department intervenes.

Vulnerability of the Electrical Installation

The most likely initial cause in events like this is a failure in the temporary electrical installation.

Critical Failure Point: Electrical engineering at large events often contends with circuit overloads, low-quality (improvised) connections, and poor panel distribution. A short-circuit or an insulation failure of the conductor (due to friction or excessive heat) can be the ignition point.

Mitigation: It is fundamental to use Surge Protective Devices (SPD), circuit breakers with appropriate curves and capacity, and to ensure correct wire sizing considering the grouping factor and the high ambient temperature of the Amazon region.

The Engineering Response: Active and Passive Systems in Action

The success in controlling the COP 30 fire depends on the correct execution of the PSCIP (Fire Safety Plan) and the brigade's training.

Detection and Alarm Systems

In a pavilion, rapid smoke detection is vital.

Challenge: Tall and open structures make it difficult for spot detectors to sense smoke effectively.

Engineering Solution: Implementation of beam detectors (which monitor large areas) or aspirating smoke detection systems should be mandatory, ensuring the fire alarm is activated in the first few seconds. A delay in detection means an exponential increase in risk.

Hydrants (Fire Hoses) and Flow Rate

The firefighting capacity directly depends on the hydraulic engineering of the industrial fire hydrant system.

Design Criterion: The design must secure the Fire Reserve Water Supply (RTI) and ensure that the fire pumps are capable of providing the required flow and pressure (measured in GPM and PSI/meters of water column - m.c.a.) demanded by the NBR standards (or equivalent NFPA/UL standards) for the risk level. Pump failure or lack of water would be catastrophic.

The Human Factor and Evacuation Planning

Traffic Engineering and Architecture unite to ensure human safety.

Exit Dimensioning (NBR 9077/NFPA 101 Equivalent): Egress routes must be sized not only for the maximum number of occupants but also for the required time of abandonment. Panic at an international event necessitates wider corridors and clearly marked exits (uninterruptible emergency lighting).

Compartmentation: In a provisional and open structure, horizontal compartmentation (using fire-resistant physical barriers) limits toxic smoke, the greatest risk to life during a fire.

Engineering, Sustainability, and the Future of COP

The COP 30 incident is a powerful reminder that sustainability begins with life safety. Sustainable infrastructure does not exist if it is not resilient and safe.

Fire Safety Engineering must be viewed as the first and most crucial layer of risk management in any project, especially those with global visibility. The incident serves as a call to action for all engineers: compliance with the PSCIP/Fire Safety Plan and rigorous auditing of temporary electrical installations are non-negotiable.

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